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Introduction
It is well recognized in both the theoretical literature and the antitrust law that information exchange between firms in an oligopolistic industry can have several effects (see, for example, Nalebuff and Zeckhauser (1986) and Kühn and Vives (1994) ). On the one hand, more precise information about the market allows the firms to make more effective decisions. On the other hand, information exchange may facilitate collusion and increase barriers to entry, which reduce consumer surplus. Therefore, assessing the effects of communication on equilibrium prices and production is both interesting from the theoretical point of view and important for developing guidelines for competition Date policy. This paper contributes to the discussion by studying the possibility of informative communication in a Cournot oligopoly model where the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs.
There is a large literature on information exchange in oligopoly with private information about costs. In a typical scenario, the firms participate in information exchange before playing a one-shot Cournot game. Information is assumed to be verifiable, i.e. a firm can conceal its private information but cannot misrepresent it. Examples include Fried (1984) , Li (1985) , Gal-Or (1986) , Shapiro (1986) , Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990), Raith (1996) and Amir, Jin and Troege (2010) . 1 Most of these papers assume that each firm decides whether to share its information or not before it observes the cost realization. (An exception is the paper by Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990) , which assumes that each firm decides whether to reveal its cost realization after observing it.) The conclusion from this literature is that in a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand, constant marginal cost and independently distributed cost shocks, each firm finds it profitable to commit to disclose its private information.
However, the assumption that private information is costlessly verifiable may be restrictive. Ziv (1993) notes that that information about a firm's cost function "is part of an internal accounting system that is not subject to external audit and not disclosed in the firm's financial statements" (p. 456), which makes it potentially costly or impossible to verify, and that even if the verification took place, punishment for misrepresenting the information is unavailable in a one-shot game, because contracts that prescribe such punishment may violate antitrust law. In some cases, external verification of information is impossible in principle, as when the communication between firms takes the form of planned production preannouncements (an empirical investigation of information exchange via production preannouncements can be found in Doyle 1 to the agents. 5 As a result, the firms are not doing as well as they could in a cartel with enforcement power. 6 Our results have two implications for competition policy. First, they add a new aspect to the question of whether firms should be allowed to exchange disaggregated versus aggregate data. This issue is currently viewed mainly from the perspective of determining which of the regimes is more conducive to sustaining collusive equilibria when the firms interact repeatedly. From this point of view, the exchange of disaggregated data may be more harmful than the exchange of aggregate statistics, because, in case of a deviation from the collusive agreement, the former regime allows to establish the identity of the deviator (Kühn and Vives, 1994) . For this reason, the competition policy views the exchange of aggregate statistics more favorably (for example, Kühn and Vives (1994) note that the European Commission "has no objection to the exchange of information on production or sales as long as the data does not go as far as to identify individual businesses"). What we show is that information aggregation can have another effect: it can relax the incentive compatibility constraint of the participants of the data exchange and thus lead to more information revelation. 7 Second, our results contradict the notion that efficiency-enhancing exchange of unverifiable information is infeasible, and therefore the only possible purpose for the exchange of such information is to sustain a collusive agreement. For example, the 2010 OECD report on "Information Exchanges between Competitors under Competition Law" states: 5 Myerson (1982) provides a revelation principle for mechanism design problems without enforcement. This approach has been used to study sealed-bid double auctions (Matthews and Postlewaite, 1989 ), battle of the sexes (Banks and Calvert, 1992) , bargaining in the shadow of war (Hörner, Morelli and Squintani, 2011) . 6 See Cramton and Palfrey (1990) for the analysis of such cartels in a static setting. In the case of repeated interactions, cartel enforcement can be achieved by threats of future punishment (Chakrabarti, 2010) . 7 In their narrative analysis of the Sugar Institute, a cartel of sugar refiners that operated in the US in 1928-1936, Genesove and Mullin (1997) note that the confidentiality procedures adopted by the Institute in gathering and aggregating the data may have been adopted to insure incentive compatibility for participating firms. To our knowledge, this insight has never before been formalized within a theoretical oligopoly model. 6 MARIA GOLTSMAN AND GREGORY PAVLOV Empirical evidence shows that the positive effects for consumers of public announcements outweigh the possible collusive effects from the transparency they generate. Because of this, it can be very difficult in practice to distinguish whether public information exchanges have a procompetitive effect or simply facilitate collusion. One important factor that the literature points out is that communications between firms may have little value in facilitating coordination unless the information is verifiable.
Information which is not verifiable can be dismissed as "cheap talk" and therefore disregarded. However, some have suggested that "cheap talk"
can assist in a meeting of minds and allow firms to reach an understand- We show that this is not necessarily true, and that exchange of unverifiable information can be efficiency-enhancing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe an example that illustrates the ideas behind our results. Section 3 contains a description of the model.
In Section 4 we analyze unmediated public communication (cheap talk) and show that it cannot result in informative communication unless there exist unproductive types. In Section 5 we exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication. Concluding comments are in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix unless stated otherwise.
Example
Consider two symmetric firms producing a homogeneous good, the inverse demand for which is P (Q) = 3 − Q. Each firm has a linear cost function, the value of the marginal cost being its private information. Specifically, each firm can be either of type L, with the marginal cost of 0, or H, with the marginal cost of 2. The types are independently and identically distributed, and the probability of type L is p ∈ (0, 1).
Regardless of the type realization, each firm has a capacity constraint of x units, where
where c i is the marginal cost of firm i. It is easy to check that for a firm of type L, the capacity constraint binds whenever its expectation of the opponent's output does not exceed 1, and such a firm will find it optimal to produce x. On the other hand, the capacity constraint never binds for a firm of type H, and its optimal output is
To start, consider the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game where the firms simultaneously choose their outputs. In this equilibrium, a firm of type L chooses
x and a firm of type H chooses q H that satisfies the equation
The solution to this equation is q H = 1−px 3−p . Now suppose that the firms can commit to truthfully disclosing their cost realization to the competitor before making their production decisions. In this case, if the firms learn that both of them are of type H, both will produce 1 3 ; if they learn that one of the firms is of type H and the other one of type L, the type-H firm will produce 1−x 2 . As before, a type-L firm will produce x regardless of what it knows about the opponent.
It is straightforward to check that in this case, the ex ante expected profit of each firm 8 MARIA GOLTSMAN AND GREGORY PAVLOV is higher than in the case where the costs are private information. 8 Therefore, if the firms could participate in such an information-sharing agreement, they would have an incentive to do so.
Suppose, however, that such an information-sharing agreement is infeasible, and all a firm can do is make a public announcement about its marginal cost realization before choosing its output level. The announcements are made simultaneously, and are costless and unverifiable ("cheap talk"): a firm has no way to check whether its opponent has told the truth about its marginal cost. Let us show that in this case, the firms will not reveal their information truthfully in equilibrium.
Indeed, suppose a truthful equilibrium exists. In such an equilibrium, if a firm truthfully announces type H, it will find it optimal to produce 1 3 if the opponent announces H as well, and 1−x 2 if the opponent announces L. A firm of type L that truthfully discloses its type will find it optimal to produce x no matter what the opponent announces. Suppose that a type-H firm discloses its type truthfully. Then with probability p it will learn from its opponent's announcement that the opponent will produce x, and with the remaining probability it will learn that the opponent will produce 1 3 . But suppose that a type-H firm deviates and announces that its type is L; then with probability p it will still learn that the opponent will produce x, but with the remaining probability it will learn that the opponent will produce 1−x 2 < 1 3 . Because the firm prefers the opponent to produce less, this deviation is profitable, and a truthful equilibrium does not exist. Therefore, even though the firms have an ex ante incentive to share their information, sharing it truthfully through cheap-talk messages is impossible: a high-cost firm will have an incentive to pretend that its cost is low in order to scare the opponent into producing less. 9 8 The difference in the ex ante expected profits between the complete information and the incomplete information case equals p(1−p) 2 (3x−1)(81x+5p−21−21px)
36(3−p) 2
, which is strictly positive for any p ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ 1 3 , 1 . 9 In principle, the cheap-talk game could have a mixed-strategy equilibrium where the messages were partially informative about the types; however, in this example such equlilibria do not exist.
To counteract this incentive, let us amend the information exchange scheme as follows. Suppose that, instead of announcing their types to each other, the firms report them privately to a neutral trustworthy third party (a mediator). We still assume that the reports are costless and unverifiable. If both firms have reported that they are of type H, the mediator makes a public announcement to that effect; otherwise the mediator remains silent. We will show that in equilibrium, both firms will have an incentive to report truthfully, and their ex ante welfare will be higher than without communication.
Indeed, if both firms have truthfully announced that they are of type H, then they learn that this is the case, and each of them chooses to produce 1 3 . If a firm of type H has truthfully reported its type, but the mediator remains silent, then the firm learns that the opponent is of type L, and thus best responds with 1−x 2 . A firm of type L always finds it optimal to produce x. Therefore, conditional on any type profile, the equilibrium outputs are the same as in the case when the firms commit to disclosing their types truthfully, and therefore the ex ante profit is also the same. Let us now check that reporting truthfully is incentive compatible. Suppose a firm of type H reports truthfully. Then, as in the case of full revelation, with probability p it will learn that the opponent will produce x (and best respond with 1−x 2 ), and with the remaining probability it will learn that the opponent will produce 1 3 (and best respond with 1 3 ). If a type-H firm deviates and reports L, its opponent's output will be equal to x with probability p and 1−x 2 with probability 1−p, just as in case of full revelation; but unlike that case, the firm will have to choose how much to produce without the benefit of knowing how much the opponent will produce. Its best response to the lottery over the opponent's output is to produce ) . It is also easy to check that a type-L firm will find it profitable to report truthfully for any values of p ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ 1 3 , 1 . The intuition for why the mechanism above is incentive compatible is that, at the reporting stage, it makes the firms face a tradeoff between inducing the opponent to produce less in expectation (by sending message L) and learning exactly how much the opponent is going to produce (by sending message H). Different types of the firm resolve this tradeoff differently. A type-H firm values information about how much the opponent will produce; in contrast, a type-L firm always finds it optimal to choose the same output level and thus faces no need to coordinate with the opponent. This makes it possible for the firms to truthfully reveal their information and improve their expected profit relative to the no-communication case. 10 
The model
We consider a model of Cournot competition between two firms, A and B, with differentiated products. The inverse demand curve for firm i's product is given by
where q i is the output of firm i. We assume that ρ(0) > 0 and −ρ (q i ) ≥ β > 0 for every q i ≥ 0. The interpretation is that the products of the two firms are perfect or imperfect substitutes, and "own effect" on demand is greater than the "cross effect". 11 Firm i's cost function is C(q i , c i ) such that C(0, c i ) = 0, ∂C(q i ,c i ) ∂q i ≥ 0 with strict inequality for q i > 0, and ∂ 2 C(q i ,c i ) ∂q 2 i ≥ 0. A higher value of the parameter c i is associated with higher firm i's total cost and marginal cost:
We assume that c i is privately observed by firm i, and that c A and c B are independently distributed on C = [0, c] according to a continuous distribution function F with density f > 0.
In Lemma 4 in the Appendix we show that rational behavior by the firms always results in strictly positive prices, and thus we can take P (q i , q −i ) = ρ(q i ) − βq −i from now on. The profit of firm i of type c i when it produces q i and its competitor produces
Let q(q −i , c i ) be the set of best responses of firm i of type c i to the opponent's output
We will impose the following conditions on the best response correspondence q:
To guarantee A1 and A2, it is enough to assume that the components of the profit are twice continuously differentiable and that ρ is "not too convex" (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix for the precise statement). In particular, the best response is nonincreasing in c i and q −i because of ∂ 2 C(q i ,c i ) ∂c i ∂q i ≥ 0 and β > 0. Condition A3 simply requires that the most efficient type never chooses to shut down, even if facing the most efficient opponent who chooses the monopoly output.
For some results in the next section, we will require that all types always choose strictly positive output: Let us illustrate these conditions with an example.
Substituting q(q −i , c i ) into the expression for the profit (1) we obtain the indirect profit function of firm i:
Unmediated communication
In this section, we allow the firms to communicate directly with each other using costless and unverifiable messages before choosing their output levels. First, to provide a benchmark, we describe what happens in the game with no communication. After that we investigate the consequences of allowing one round of cheap talk communication. Finally, we look at games with any pre-determined finite number of rounds of cheap talk communication.
It is well-known that in the complete-information Cournot game with two firms, the unique intersection of the firms' best responses determines not only the unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile, but also the unique outcome of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. 12 In our setting, we have an analogous result for the game with no communication. 13 Lemma 1. Suppose that conditions A1-A3 hold. Then in the game with no communication the profile of strategies where each firm plays according to
is the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and the unique profile of strategies that survives iterated elimination of interim strictly dominated strategies.
Note that in the games with multiple equilibria, one possible role for preplay communication is to allow the players to coordinate among equilibria. Given Lemma 1, preplay communication in our setting cannot be used purely for coordination, but has to involve some information revelation.
We consider the following game where the firms can engage in cheap-talk communication before making their output choices. Let M A and M B be the sets of possible messages for firms A and B. Each firm i sends a costless message m i ∈ M i , and the messages are publicly observed. Firm i's pure strategy is thus a pair of 
Next we show that if some of the firms' cost types are so unproductive that they prefer to shut down under all circumstances, then the cheap-talk game can have informative equilibria.
There exists the following equilibrium with informative cheap talk: firm A sends one message when it is "productive" (c A < K) and another message otherwise; firm B always sends the same message regardless of its costs. To see that this is an equilibrium, first note that the "unproductive" types of firm A are indifferent between sending both messages, because their profit is always zero. The "productive" types prefer to tell the truth, because firm B behaves as a monopolist if it believes that firm A is "unproductive", and produces less if it believes that firm A is "productive". 15 The literature on oligopoly communication typically makes assumptions that rule out the possibility of such unproductive cost types. So for the rest of this section we investigate the possibility of informative cheap talk communication under the assumption that all types always choose positive outputs (Condition A4).
The question whether informative cheap talk between oligopolists is possible has been considered by Ziv (1993) in the context of a model with undifferentiated products, linear demand and constant marginal cost (which corresponds to Example 1 with β = γ = 1).
Ziv's Proposition 3 shows that if the parameters are such that all cost types always find it optimal to produce, no informative equilibrium exists. 16 The logic behind this result is simple. First, every cost type of, say, firm A is strictly better off if firm B produces less. Second, firm B's equilibrium output choice depends on its expectation of firm A's cost: the higher this expectation, the more firm B will choose to produce, regardless of its cost type. Finally, if an informative cheap-talk equilibrium was possible, different messages by firm A would induce firm B to have different expectations of firm A's cost.
But then all types of firm A would have an incentive to deviate to the message that minimizes firm B's expectation of firm A's cost.
We find that this intuitive argument is not applicable to the case where the demand or the cost functions are nonlinear. In particular, the second step of the argument breaks down: it could be the case that one message corresponds to a higher expected level of the cost parameter than another, yet some types of the competitor choose to produce more after hearing the second message than the first one. This point is illustrated by the following numerical example. 
This example shows that in a nonlinear setting, the optimal output following a message profile depends not only on the expected value of the firm's posterior distribution over the opponent's type, but on the other characteristics of this distribution as well.
However, using a different technique, we are still able to show that there are no informative equilibria in the game with one round of cheap talk.
Theorem 1. Suppose that conditions A1, A2 and A4 hold. Then the game with one round of cheap talk communication has no informative equilibrium. That is, following any equilibrium message profile (m i , m −i ), the expected output of each firm i satisfies Q i (m i , m −i ) = Q N C , and firm i plays the same strategy as in the game without
The result of Theorem 1 extends to the setting where the firms can engage in finitely many rounds of cheap talk. 17 Specifically, suppose there are T > 1 possible communication stages, at each stage t = 1, ..., T each firm simultaneously chooses a message, and their choices become commonly known at the end of the stage. After that, the firms choose outputs. We show that informative cheap talk is impossible in such a game with a pre-determined finite number of rounds. 18 Theorem 2. Suppose that conditions A1, A2 and A4 hold. Then the game with finitely many rounds of cheap-talk communication has no informative equilibrium.
The impossibility of informative cheap-talk communication in our model stands in contrast with a number of results on two-sided cheap talk with two-sided incomplete information. For example, informative cheap-talk equilibria have been shown to exist in the double auction game (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989; Matthews and Postlewaite, 1989 ), in the arms-race game (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) , and in the peace negotiations game (Hörner, Morelli and Squintani, 2011) . However, in all these papers the underlying games have multiple equilibria, and the ability to have different continuation equilibria following different message profiles seems important for sustaining informative communication. In our setting, there is a unique continuation equilibrium for every posterior belief (Lemma 2), which makes it harder to sustain informative communication.
Mediated Communication
In this section, we assume that, before choosing how much to produce, the firms can communicate with a neutral and trustworthy third party (a mediator), which is initially ignorant of the firm's private information. Both firms, as well as the mediator, can send private or public messages according to a mediation rule, or mechanism, which specifies what messages the parties can send, in what sequence, and whether the messages are public or private. After the communication has ended, the firms simultaneously choose their outputs.
We assume that the mediator's role is limited to participating in communication between the firms and that it has no enforcement power over the firms' output choices.
This distinguishes our setting from a standard mechanism design problem, where the mechanism designer can enforce the mechanism outcome, and makes it a mechanism design problem without enforcement. The literature on such problems, which dates back to Myerson (1982) , suggests that in certain settings, mediated communication allows the players to strictly improve upon cheap talk. 19 This is what we find in our model as well. Before exhibiting an informative mechanism, however, let us note that if the mediator is able only to send, but not to receive, messages from the firms, improving upon the uninformative Bayesian-Nash equilibrium outcome is impossible. More formally, suppose all the mediator can do is send the firms private messages m A and m B from some message sets M A and M B , generated according to a commonly known probability distribution p ∈ ∆(M A × M B ). (The Bayesian-Nash equilibria of communication games of this form are called the strategic form correlated equilibria of the game with no communication (Forges, 1993) .) The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the fact, established in Lemma 1, that the game without communication is interim dominance solvable. If the mediator can also receive messages from the firms, this result is no longer valid, as the example in Section 2 suggests. What we will do next is generalize the mechanism described in the example, and provide sufficient conditions for it to result in informative communication in our model. Specifically, let c * ∈ (0, c), and consider the mechanism which works as follows. Each firm i sends a private messageĉ i ∈ [0, c], which is interpreted as the firm's report about its cost, to the mediator. The mediator then publicly announces one message, m 0 , if min {ĉ A ,ĉ B } ≤ c * and another message, m 1 , otherwise. After that, the firms choose their outputs. Let us call such a mechanism the "min" mechanism with threshold c * . 20 This mechanism induces a game between the firms, where a pure strategy for firm i ∈ {A, B} consists of a reporting strategyĉ i (c i ) and an output strategy
where m ∈ {m 0 , m 1 }. We will say that the mechanism is incentive compatible if it has an equilibrium where the firms report their types truthfully:
As in Section 2, the idea behind this mechanism is to give each firm a choice between having the competitor produce less in expectation and getting more information about how much the competitor will produce. Specifically, suppose that firm i reportsĉ i ≤ c * .
Then, if firm j has reportedĉ j > c * , the mediator will announce message m 0 , and firm j will learn that firm i has reported its cost to be low. This will make firm j produce less in expectation, which is favorable to firm i. However, firm i reportingĉ i ≤ c * also deprives it of an opportunity to learn anything about firm j's report, because the mediator will announce m 0 regardless of firm j's report. Conversely, reportinĝ c i > c * will result in firm j producing more in expectation, but will enable firm i to learn whetherĉ j is above or below c * . The mechanism will be incentive compatible if different types of the firm resolve this tradeoff differently: types above c * value additional information about the opponent more than the reduction in the opponent's expected output, while types below c * exhibit the reverse preference. 21 To guarantee the incentive compatibility of our mechanism, we will impose the following additional condition on the best response functions:
To interpret this condition, note that
The denominator of the latter expression measures how much the indirect profit of firm i changes with the expected output of the opponent, so it shows how much firm i values a reduction in the opponent's output. The numerator measures how convex the indirect profit function is, and thus how much the firm values information about the opponent's output. Condition A5 is a "single-crossing condition" on firms' preferences: it says that 21 Similar logic lies behind the results of Seidmann (1990) and Watson (1996) , who show that in a sender-receiver game with two-sided private information, an informative equilibrium can exist even if all the sender's types have the same preference ordering over the receiver's actions. This is because different types of the receiver respond differently to the sender's messages, and thus, from the sender's viewpoint, each message corresponds to a lottery over the receiver's actions. Informative communication is possible if different sender types have a different preference ranking over these lotteries. This effect has also been emphasized by Baliga and Sjöström (2004) in the context of an arms-race game. Unlike our model, however, these settings admit informative cheap talk.
the higher the firm's cost, the more it values information about the opponent relative to reduction in opponent's expected output.
In addition, we will impose a condition that guarantees that each firm's output sufficiently varies with respect to its type:
Therefore, A5 holds if γ < 2, and A6 is always satisfied.
Condition A5 implies that to ensure that the "min" mechanism is incentive compatible, it is enough to choose threshold c * to be the type that is indifferent between reportingĉ ≤ c * andĉ > c * : if type c * is indifferent, then any type above c * will strictly prefer reportingĉ > c * , and any type below c * will strictly prefer reportingĉ ≤ c * .
The following theorem shows that when the support of the cost distribution is large enough, such c * can be found.
Theorem 3. Suppose that conditions A1-A3, A5 and A6 hold, and that c is large enough. Then there exists c * ∈ (0, c) such that the "min" mechanism with threshold c * is incentive compatible.
It remains an open question whether it is possible to construct an informative mechanism when conditions A5 or A6 do not hold. Suppose, for example, that A5 holds with the reverse inequality for every (q −i , c i ). A natural guess is that one could construct an informative "max" mechanism, whereby the mediator announces whether max {ĉ A ,ĉ B } ≤ c * . However, this guess is incorrect: if such a mechanism was in place, a low cost report would both lower the opponent's output and result in more information about the opponent, and therefore every cost type would have an incentive to send a low report. We conjecture that in that case, informative communication is impossible. We also conjecture that A6 could be somewhat relaxed; however, sufficient heterogeneity in the behavior of different cost types seems essential for sustaining informative communication.
The next theorem shows that whenever a "min" mechanism is incentive compatible, it interim Pareto dominates the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium without communication for the firms.
Theorem 4. If an incentive compatible "min" mechanism exists, then every type of every firm is better off under this mechanism than in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium without communication. If, in addition, condition A4 holds, then every type of every firm is strictly better off.
The intuition behind this theorem is that, when a "min" mechanism is in place, reportingĉ ≤ c * results in higher expected profit for every type than the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium without communication. This is because in both cases, the firm gets no information, but reportingĉ ≤ c * results in lower expected output by the opponent than the uninformative equilibrium. Since reportingĉ ≤ c * is possible for every type and the mechanism is incentive compatible, in equilibrium every type's expected profit must be at least as high as the one guaranteed by this action.
While we are unable to provide a general result on how the total surplus and the consumer surplus under the "min" mechanism compare to those in the no-communication equilibrium, the following example shows that in some cases, the "min" mechanism results in a higher total surplus (although a lower consumer surplus). A has private information about costs, and firm B's cost is commonly known. In this case, public or deterministic mechanisms cannot support informative communication:
firm A can precisely anticipate firm B's output choice, and thus there is no residual uncertainty about firm B's output, which is essential for sustaining information revelation by firm A. Nonetheless, one can construct an informative mechanism of the following form. After receiving the cost report from firm A, the mediator sends a noisy (but informative) private signal to firm B, and, in addition, a blind carbon copy of this signal is sent to firm A if and only if its reported costs are high. As a result, the types of firm A that report high costs expect on average a higher output by firm B, but are compensated by information useful for predicting firm B's output.
Discussion
Our model can be extended to accommodate the case of more than two firms. Specifically, suppose that the inverse demand for firm i's product is max {ρ
where q −i = j =i q j is the aggregate output of all firms other than i, and, as before, let q(q −i , c i ) be the best response function of each firm. The proofs of Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 go through once we replace the second part of Condition A2 by a stronger assumption ∂q(q −i ,c i ) 23 The proof of Theorem 2 also extends to the case of more than two firms, if Condition A2 is modified as above. However, this theorem, as well as Theorem 1, covers only the case where all the communication between the firms is public. With two firms, this is clearly without loss of generality, but with three or more firms, one can also consider communication protocols whereby each firm can send private messages to a subset of 23 To see how the proof of Theorem 1 should be modified, fix any firm i, and let (m i , m −i ) be a message profile. Let BR −i (q i |m −i ) = j =i q j , where (q j ) j =i are a solution to the system of equations q j = BR j (q −j |m j ), j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i} (this solution, and therefore the function BR −i , depends on m i and q i ). Then define q i , q i , q −i , q −i analogously to q A , q A , q B , q B . As in Theorem 1, we get
Combining these inequalities and summing up over i results in (1−δ) (n − 1)
other firms. There are reasons to expect that the result of Theorem 2 will no longer hold once private communication is allowed: indeed, Ben-Porath (2003) proves that in a finite game, any communication equilibrium that assigns only rational probabilities to outcomes can be replicated by a sequential equilibrium of some unmediated communication protocol, if the number of players is at least three. Despite the fact that Ben-Porath's result is not directly applicable in this case because of the finiteness assumption, it might be possible to extend it to cover at least some simple communication equilibria (such as the "min" mechanism) in our model. Finally, if we extend the definition the "min" mechanism as the mechanism that informs the firms whether the minimum of the reported costs is above or below a certain threshold, then we expect the proof of Theorem 3 to go through.
Next, suppose that, instead of cost shocks, the firms face private demand shocks.
In particular, suppose θ i is a private (iid) demand shock that affects firm i as follows:
Then we can define the best response function q (q −i , θ i ), make the same assumptions A1-A6 with θ i in place of c i , and replicate all the analysis.
The question of whether any of the results would extend to the case where cost or demand shocks are correlated is more difficult. To see why, suppose that each firm receives a signal about a common cost parameter. Now each firm might prefer to be perceived as having a high cost signal rather than a low cost signal, because if the opponent believes the report about the high cost signal, then it may decide to produce less. We leave this question for future research.
Finally, one may also ask whether the results of the paper apply to a Bertrand model with differentiated products. Because prices are strategic complements, each firm will have an incentive to overstate its type, which is the opposite of what happens in the Cournot model. Nevertheless, we believe that, when the assumptions are adjusted to reflect this change, the results of the paper will go through with the "max" mechanism (the mediator announcing whether the maximum of the cost reports exceeds a certain threshold) replacing the "min" mechanism in Theorem 3. (
Appendix
Proof. (i) Let q be the revenue-maximizing output when q −i = 0, i.e. q = arg max
Since |ρ (q i )| ≥ β, q cannot be greater than ρ(0) β . This, together with the fact that the revenue is continuous in q i , implies that q exists. Since the revenue is zero at q i = 0 and q i = ρ(0) β , the solution is interior and satisfies the first-order condition: ρ (q) q + ρ (q) = 0.
Note that no type c i ∈ C will find it optimal to choose output higher than q regardless of the conjecture about the opponent's play. This is because such outputs result in (weakly) lower revenue than q (not just when q −i = 0, but for every q −i ≥ 0), and strictly higher cost (because ∂C(q i ,c i )
where the first inequality is because ρ < 0 and β > 0, the equality is by definition of q, and the second inequality is due to |ρ (q)| ≥ β.
(ii) Note that
for every q i ≥ 0. Thus π i is strictly concave in q i , and therefore q is single-valued.
By the Theorem of the Maximum, q is continuous in (q −i , c i ). Note that q equals 0 if
≤ 0, and solves the first-order condition
Let q be as defined in part (i). Then
where the first inequality uses the facts that that β ≤ −ρ (q), q −i ≤ q, and ∂C(0,c i )
the second inequality uses the first-order condition for q. Thus q(q −i , c i ) > 0 for every
Proofs of Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let
Let M A = M and M B = N be the sets of equilibrium messages for firms A and B, respectively, and (m, n) be a representative element of M × N . Then the expected outputs in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium following messages (m, n) satisfy |n) ). By A2, H maps the interval [0, q(0, 0)] 2 into itself. A2 also implies that for every c i and Q −i = Q −i :
This in turn implies that H is a contraction mapping in the sup norm.
and for k ≥ 1, let
Because H is a contraction mapping on [0, q(0, 0)] 2 , the sequence Q k A , Q k B ∞ k=0 converges. By continuity of BR i (·|m i ), its limit satisfies (6) and thus defines the expected outputs in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Next, let us prove that any strategy q i (m i , m −i , c i ) of firm i that survives k rounds of elimination of interim strictly dominated strategies has to satisfy q i (m i , m −i , c i )dF (c i |m i ) ∈ I k i . Indeed, the statement holds for k = 1: for every i,
strictly dominated for type c i . Thus the first round of elimination leaves only strategies
Suppose that the statement holds for k ≥ 1, i.e. k rounds of elimination result in strategies for firm −i such that
Conditional on firm −i using such strategies,
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is interim strictly dominated for type c i . Therefore, firm i's strategies surviving k + 1 rounds of elimination satisfy
be the equilibrium expected output following messages (m, n).
Therefore, any strategy profile that survives iterated elimination of interim strictly dominated strategies has to satisfy q
and the only strategy profile that survives the elimination is the one satisfying q i (m i , m −i , c i ) = q(Q i (m, n), c i ), which is the condition for the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Before proving Theorems 1 and 2, we need some preliminary results. Suppose there exists an informative cheap talk equilibrium. The fact that the equilibrium is informative implies that max {|M |, |N |} ≥ 2. We will assume, without loss of generality, that every message induces a different distribution over the opponent's output. To state this assumption formally, let σ i (·|c i ) be a probability distribution over M i defining the message strategy of firm i, and let
be the distribution function of firm −i's expected output conditional on firm i sending message m i . Then we will assume that 
where the first equality is obtained through integration by parts (the validity of integration by parts is guaranteed by Theorem II.6.11 of Shiryaev (2000) , which applies because the support of q B is bounded and Π A is decreasing in q B ), and the second equality is by the Envelope Theorem. Moreover, A4 implies that q (q B , c A ) > 0 for every (q B , c A ), so, because G(x|m) = G(x|m ), the inequality is strict. Hence every type c A strictly prefers sending message m to message m, which is a contradiction. Lemma 6. Suppose A1-A4 hold. For every n, n ∈ N such that n = n , ∃q * (n, n ) = (q * A (n, n ), q * B (n, n )) such that q * B (n, n ) = BR B (q * A (n, n )|n) = BR B (q * A (n, n )|n ). Moreover, ∃m, m ∈ M s.t. q * A (n, n ) is strictly between Q A (m, n) and Q A (m , n). A symmetric statement holds for any m, m ∈ M such that m = m .
Proof. By Lemma 5, there must exist m, m ∈ M such that Q A (m, n) > Q A (m, n ) and Q A (m , n) < Q A (m , n ).
Let
Function φ is increasing in q A , since BR −1 A is steeper than BR B . By (6) , φ (Q A ( m,ñ); m,ñ) = 0 for every ( m,ñ).
Note that
where the equalities use (6); the inequality holds because Q A (m, n) > Q A (m, n ) and
because φ is increasing. Similarly,
Since the best responses, and thus ψ, are continuous, from (8) and (9) it follows that there exists q * (n, n ) at which BR B (· | n) and BR B (· | n ) intersect, and q * A (n, n ) is strictly between Q A (m, n) and Q A (m , n) by construction.
For i ∈ {A, B}, let q i = inf (m,n)∈M ×N Q i (m, n); that is, ∀(m, n) ∈ M ×N , Q i (m, n) ≥ q i , and ∀ε > 0, ∃(m, n) ∈ M ×N : Q i (m, n) ≤ q i +ε. Similarly, let q i = sup (m,n)∈M ×N Q i (m, n).
Note that q i is finite, because Q i (m, n) ≤ q i (0, 0) < ∞. By definition, q i ≤ q i ; the fact that the equilibrium is informative implies that q i < q i (indeed,if q i = q i = q i , then Q i (m, n) = q i , ∀(m, n) ∈ M × N ; therefore, Q j (m, n) is also constant with respect to (m, n), and the equilibrium is uninformative).
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose an informative equilibrium exists. Let us first prove that (10) (
For this, it is sufficient to prove that for any ε > 0, however small,
Fix any ε > 0. By definition of q B , there exists (m, n) ∈ M × N such that Q B (m, n) ∈
If n = n , both Q(m, n) = (Q A (m, n), Q B (m, n)) and Q(m , n ) = (Q A (m , n ), Q B (m , n )) satisfy the equation q B = BR B (q A |n). Then by A2, and since Q A (m, n) < Q A (m , n ), we have
By the choice of (m, n) and (m , n ), we also have
Combining this with (12), we get (11) .
If n = n , by Lemma 6 there exists q * (n, n ) = (q * A (n, n ) , q * B (n, n )) such that q * B (n, n ) = BR B (q * A (n, n )|n) = BR B (q * A (n, n )|n ), and q * A (n, n ) ∈ (Q A (m, n), Q A (m, n)) for somem,m ∈ M . There are three cases to consider. Case 1: Q A (m, n) < q * A (n, n ) < Q A (m , n ). The first inequality, together with the fact that both Q(m, n) and q * (n, n ) satisfy the equation q B = BR B (q A |n), implies
Similarly, the second inequality implies
Summing up (13) and (14) gives (12) , which, as when n = n , implies (11).
Case 2: q * A (n, n ) ≤ Q A (m, n) < Q A (m , n ). Like in Case 1, q * A (n, n ) < Q A (m , n ) implies (14) . Since q A ≤ Q A (m, n) < q * A (n, n ), we have q A − q A ≥ Q A (m , n ) − q * A (n, n ). Since q * (n, n ) and Q(m, n) lie on the curve q B = BR B (q A |n), which is downward sloping, q * B (n, n ) ≥ Q B (m, n) > q B − ε. Hence, q * B (n, n ) − Q B (m , n ) > q B − q B − 2ε. Combining this with (14) , we get (11).
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MARIA GOLTSMAN AND GREGORY PAVLOV Case 3: Q A (m, n) < Q A (m , n ) ≤ q * A (n, n ). Like in Case 1, Q A (m, n) < q * A (n, n ) implies (13) . Since q * A (n, n ) < Q A (m, n) ≤ q A , we have q A − q A ≥ q * A (n, n ) − Q A (m, n). Since q * (n, n ) and Q(m , n ) lie on the curve
Combining this with (13), we get (11) . Symmetrically, we can show
which is in contradiction with (10) and the fact that δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Theorem 2. Note that nowhere in the proof of Theorem 1 did we use the fact that each firm's cost types are distributed according to the same distribution F . In fact Theorem 1 holds even if we assume that the cost types of firms A and B are distributed according to distributions F A and F B , respectively, independently of each other.
Specifically, first note that in the case of different prior distributions, F A and F B , in the game without cheap talk communication by Lemma 2 there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is also a unique outcome of the iterated dominance procedure.
This strategy profile is given by
Next, following the steps of the proof of Theorem 1, one can verify that in the game with one round of cheap talk, following any message profile (m i , m −i ) the expected quantity of firm i satisfies Q i (m i , m −i ) = Q N C i , for i = A, B. Following any message profile firm i plays the same strategy as in the no-communication equilibrium:
Next, suppose there exist no informative t-round cheap talk equilibrium. We will show that then every t + 1-round cheap talk equilibrium is uninformative as well.
Suppose the message profile in the first round is (m A , m B ), and the posterior be- | m B ) ). The continuation game starting from period 2 has no informative cheap talk equilibrium. That is, the expected quantities are always the same as in the game without communication,
:
Thus if in t + 1-round cheap talk game there exists an informative equilibrium, then there exists an outcome equivalent informative equilibrium where the firms use the same first-period communication strategies, and use babbling strategies in the remaining periods. However this implies that in one-round cheap talk game there exists an outcome equivalent informative equilibrium where the firms use the same first-period communication strategies as above, which is a contradiction with Theorem 1.
7.3. Proofs of Section 5. Consider a "min" mechanism with threshold c * ∈ (0, c).
After m 1 is announced, the expected output of firm −i is Q H2 (c * ) that solves Proof. Note that Φ is continuous in all variables by A1 and the continuity of F ;
where the inequality is by A2. Therefore equation (15) has a unique solution, which we will call Q H2 (c * ). The function Q H2 (c * ) is continuous by Theorem 2.1 in Jittorntrum (1978) . Let us prove that Q H2 (c * ) is decreasing in c * . First, note that for any Q −i , the function
where both inequalities follow from A2. Therefore, ifc * < c * , and Q H2 (c * ) < Q H2 (c * ),
which contradicts the assumption Q H2 (c * ) < Q H2 (c * ) (the first inequality above follows from A2 and Q H2 (c * ) < Q H2 (c * ), and the second from (16) and Q H1 (c * ) that solve equations (17) , and thus there exists a unique continuation equilibrium after public message m 0 , which is symmetric. Both Q L (c * ) and Q H1 (c * ) are continuous; Q L (c * ) is increasing and Q H1 (c * ) is decreasing in c * ; Q L (c * ) ≤ Q H1 (c * );
, c * = 0. By A1 and the continuity of F , Ψ is continuous. By A3,
where the inequalities follow from A2. Therefore for every c * there exists a unique Q L (c * ) ∈ (0, q(0, 0)) such that Ψ Q L (c * ) , c * = 0, and a unique Q H1 (c * ) defined by Ω Q L (c * ) , Q H1 (c * ) , c * = 0. The functions Q L (c * ) and Q H1 (c * ) are continuous by Theorem 2.1 in Jittorntrum (1978) .
which is a contradiction (the inequalities follow from A2).
Next, note that the function 1
where the inequalities follow from A2.
Let us now show that Q L (c * ) is increasing in c * . Suppose thatc * < c * and Q L (c * ) > Q L (c * ). Then Ψ(Q L (c * ), c * ) > Ψ(Q L (c * ), c * ), because Ψ is strictly increasing in Q L .
Since Ψ(Q L (c * ), c * ) = 0 and Ψ(Q L (c * ),c * ) = 0, we get
where the second inequality follows from A2, (18) , and definition of Q H1 ; the third inequality follows fromc * < c * , Q L (c * ) ≤ Q H1 (c * ) and A2. Hence we get a contradiction.
where the first inequality follows from (18) , and the second from Q L (c * ) ≤ Q L (c * ) and
A2. This proves that Q H1 (c * ) is decreasing in c * .
Next, Q H1 (0) = q Q L (0) , 0 ≤ q (0, 0) by A2, and therefore q Q H1 (0) , 0 ≥ q (q (0, 0) , 0) > 0 where the first inequality is by A2 and the second by A3. Therefore, by A1 and the fact that f > 0, For firm i of type c i , let ∆Π (c i ; c * ) be the gain from reportingĉ i < c * relative to reportingĉ i > c * when the "min" mechanism with threshold c * is in place:
By the Envelope Theorem, 
Suppose next that
Condition A5 implies that for q −i ∈ Q L (c * ) , Q(c) ,
Equation (20) implies
Suppose first that Q(c) < Q H1 (c * ). Then equations (21) and (22) and the fact that
Now suppose that Q(c) > Q H1 (c * ). Then equations (21) and (22) imply If q (q −i , c i ) = 0, then (25) clearly holds. If q (q −i , c i ) > 0, then, by A2, q ( q −i , c i ) > 0 for every q −i ∈ [0, q −i ]. By A5,
Thus for every q −i ∈ (0, q −i ), and every type is strictly better off under the "min" mechanism than in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium without communication.
